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ABSTRACT  
   
The attractiveness of a reward depends in part on the delay to its receipt, with 
more distant rewards generally being valued less than more proximate ones. The rate at 
which people discount the value of delayed rewards has been associated with a variety of 
clinically and socially relevant human behaviors. Thus, the accurate measurement of 
delay discounting rates is crucial to the study of mechanisms underlying behaviors such 
as risky sex, addiction, and gambling. In delay discounting tasks, participants make 
choices between two alternatives: one small amount of money delivered immediately 
versus a large amount of money delivered after a delay. After many choices, the 
experimental task will converge on an indifference point: the value of the delayed reward 
that approximates the value of the immediate one. It has been shown that these 
indifference points are systematically biased by the direction in which one of the 
alternatives adjusts. This bias is termed a sequencing effect.  
The present research proposed a reference-dependent model of choice drawn from 
Prospect Theory to account for the presence of sequencing effects in a delay discounting 
task. Sensitivity to reference frames and sequencing effects were measured in two 
computer tasks. Bayesian and frequentist analyses indicated that the reference-dependent 
model of choice cannot account for sequencing effects. Thus, an alternative, perceptual 
account of sequencing effects that draws on a Bayesian framework of magnitude 
estimation is proposed and furnished with some preliminary evidence. Implications for 
future research in the measurement of delay discounting and sensitivity to reference 
frames are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND 
Humans make choices every day that promote satisfaction and well-being. These 
choices are the product of processes that integrate characteristics and experiences specific 
to the individual as well as features of the immediate environment. Efforts abound to 
identify and explain the effects of different traits and contexts on choice; the 
attractiveness of a consequence has been shown to depend on various properties, such as 
its magnitude, valence, and certainty of and delay to its receipt (Berry, Nickerson, & 
Odum, 2017; McKerchar, Pickford, & Robertson, 2013; Nishiyama, 2016; Odum, 
Baumann, & Rimington, 2006; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991). For decades, 
researchers have devoted considerable attention to studying delay discounting—the 
inverse relationship between the value of an outcome and the time until its availability—
to better understand humans’ engagement in socially and clinically relevant behaviors. 
There are individual differences in delay discounting rates: the degree to which 
delays imposed on outcomes influence choice (see Reynolds, 2006 for a review). A 
person who tends to defer immediate satisfaction in favor of greater long-term benefit can 
be called self-controlled; a person without such a disposition might be impulsive. While 
such labels may oversimplify a collection of behaviors by framing them as a prescriptive 
personality trait, discounting rate does appear to be robust throughout the lifespan 
(Audrain-McGovern et al., 2009; Kirby, 2009), and twin and genome studies indicate that 
these rates have a significant genetic component—heritability estimates hover around 
40% (Anokhin, Golosheykin, Grant, & Heath, 2011; Gray & Mackillop, 2014; Isen, 
Sparks, & Iacono, 2014).  
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Moreover, these individual differences in discounting rate are correlated with the 
frequency and intensity of behaviors characterized by an alluring short-term gain and 
potential long-term loss, such as risky sex (Collado, Johnson, Loya, Johnson, & Yi, 2016; 
Johnson & Bruner, 2013), cigarette smoking (Audrain-McGovern et al., 2009; Odum, 
Madden, Bickel, 1999; Yi & Landes, 2012), substance abuse (Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 
1999; Yi, Mitchell, & Bickel, 2010), and pathological gambling (Petry & Casarella, 
1999; Reynolds, 2006). Due to its relevance in human choice behavior, experimenters 
have developed an array of delay discounting procedures to measure sensitivity to delay.  
A quintessential human delay discounting paradigm was introduced by Rachlin 
and colleagues (1991), who adapted a methodology used by Mazur (1987) with pigeons. 
In Rachlin et al., participants made a series of choices between two amounts of money: 
the first, between $1 and $1,000 and available immediately; the second, $1,000 available 
after a specified delay. Choices were made at seven delays that ranged from 6 hours to 25 
years. Each delay block began with a choice between either the smallest or largest 
possible immediate amount (i.e. $1 or $1,000) and the delayed $1,000. Thereafter, the 
immediate alternative was adjusted after each choice to make the initially unattractive 
alternative more alluring, and eventually the participant’s preference switched to the 
originally non-preferred option. For example, a participant may choose $1,000 available 
immediately over $1,000 available after 1 month. Then, the experimenter reduced the 
amount available immediately with each choice, and eventually the participant changed 
their choice and began preferring the delayed alternative. This switching point—the 
amount available immediately that approximated the value of the delayed $1,000—was 
referred to as the indifference point (IP), and served as an indicator of subjective value of 
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the delayed reward. Two IPs for each delay were estimated for each participant: one 
where the immediate amount started at the minimum $1 and increased (ascending 
sequence), and another where the immediate amount started at the maximum $1,000 and 
decreased (descending sequence). Then, these IPs were averaged to create one IP per 
delay, for a total of seven. Finally, a hyperbolic equation, found by Mazur (1987) to 
provide the best fit to pigeon IPs, was fit to aggregate and individual IPs along with an 
exponential function for comparison. 
Quantitative models of delay discounting 
Theoretically, an economically rational decision-maker should discount the value 
of an outcome at a constant rate over time (Samuelson, 1937). In such cases, value as a 
function of delay should decay exponentially, 
 kDV Ae  , (1) 
where V is the discounted value of a reward A delivered after delay D, and k is a free 
parameter that represents the rate at which value decays. Larger values of k result in 
steeper discounting curves, which indicate a more rapid decay of value and stronger 
preference for immediate rewards. A critical assumption of the exponential model of 
discounting is time-consistent preferences: that the rate of discounting remains constant 
for given inter-reward intervals. In other words, preference between two rewards should 
not change if a constant delay is added to both rewards. However, this assumption 
contradicts choices in everyday life. People plan to exercise at the gym, only to change 
their mind as gym time draws nigh; one might decide over breakfast to cook a healthy 
dinner later, but decide to instead purchase fast food while on the drive home that 
evening. Such preference reversals have been shown to occur in experiments with 
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humans (Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Rachlin et al., 1991), rats (Green & Estle, 
2003), and pigeons (Rodriguez & Logue, 1988). The exponential equation does not 
predict preference reversals, and thus serves as an incomplete model of intertemporal 
choice. 
In his 1987 experiment, Mazur determined that a hyperbolic equation served as 
the best-fitting quantitative model of discounting as a function of delay, 
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which has the same number of free parameters as the exponential equation (one: k), and 
often provides a superior fit to individual and aggregate IPs (Aparicio, 2015; McKerchar 
et al., 2013; Yi, Landes, & Bickel, 2009). Importantly, hyperbolic discounting models 
predict preference reversals.  
Figure 1 illustrates a preference reversal. The height of the bars represents the 
absolute (undiscounted) value of two rewards (A in Eqs. 1 and 2), and the curves 
represent the subjective value of the two rewards per a hyperbolic model. When both 
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Figure 1. Preference reversals. Subjective value of a smaller-sooner reward (SSR) and a larger-later 
reward (LLR) as a function of delay to receipt. Bar height represents absolute (i.e., undiscounted) 
reward value, and curves show predicted subjective values per the hyperbolic model of discounting. The 
point at which the curves intersect is the point of preference reversal from LLR at T1 to SSR at T2 
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rewards are subject to lengthy delays (near the origin, at T1), the subjective value of the 
larger, later reward (LLR) is greater than the smaller, sooner reward (SSR). This is 
demonstrated by the greater distance of the solid line (LLR) than the dashed line (SSR) 
from the X-axis at T1. However, as the delays are reduced (moving towards T2), the 
subjective value of the SSR overtakes that of the LLR at the intersection of the two 
hyperbolic functions. It is at this point where the allure of fast food overtakes the further-
delayed prospect of a healthy homecooked meal. The ability of the hyperbolic to account 
for such preference reversals, coupled with superior model fits to empirical discounting 
curves compared to the exponential, leads it to serve as the benchmark quantitative model 
of delay discounting (Madden & Johnson, 2010; Reynolds, 2006). 
A variety of delay discounting assessments have been employed in basic and 
translational research. Rachlin and colleagues’ (1991) adjusting-immediate-amount 
(AIA) discounting procedure elicited individual and median IPs that were better 
described by a hyperbolic equation than an exponential. Other experimenters have 
estimated delay discounting rates with psychophysical assays that employ titration (Du, 
Green, & Myerson, 2002) or randomized presentation procedures (Robles & Vargas, 
2007). Others still have estimated discounting rates with computer programs that 
resemble simple video games rather than conventional binary choice tasks 
(Dshemuchadse, Scherbaum, & Goschke, 2013; Scherbaum et al., 2016). Across 
paradigms, authors often use the parameter k from Eq. 2 as a primary dependent variable 
and find the hyperbolic function fits IP curves quite well. In many cases, the objective of 
these studies is to quantify and compare sensitivity to delay across populations or 
experimental conditions (e.g. smokers vs. non-smokers; Bickel et al, 1999). In other 
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cases, researchers instead focus on determining the shape of the discounting function and 
the mathematical formula that describes it. One avenue of research along these lines has 
suggested that a hyperboloid function is the best quantitative model of delay discounting 
(Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Rachlin, 2006), 
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where s is another free parameter, and is supposed to represent nonlinear sensitivity to 
delay. When s equals one, Equation 3 reduces to Equation 2, and takes the form of a 
simple hyperbola. When s is less than one, as has been shown to be the case in children, 
sensitivity to differences between delays is increased.  
However, Madden and Johnson (2010) advise experimenters to avoid using any of 
these mathematical models if they are interested primarily in quantifying and comparing 
sensitivity to delay between groups or conditions. In such cases, they advocate the 
calculation of area-under-the-curve (AUC) as an index of discounting rate, a technique 
originally suggested by Myerson, Green, and Warusawitharana (2001). To calculate 
AUC, a plot of indifference points is generated on a scale normalized to the maximum 
delay on the X-axis and maximum possible indifference point on the Y-axis (i.e., with a 
minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1). Then, the area under each two sequential IPs are 
calculated using the formula for a trapezoid, 
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where delays Di and Di+1 are associated with indifference points IPi and IPi+1, 
respectively. The areas of all trapezoids are summed to compute AUC; see Figure 2 (left) 
for an illustration of AUC calculation.  
One benefit of using AUC as a measure of discounting is that the frequency 
distribution of AUC values is often normal, whereas distributions of k are positively 
skewed (Myerson et al., 2001). Therefore, AUC is a measure better suited for parametric 
inferential statistics than untransformed k values. In addition, Myerson et al. argue that 
AUC is theoretically neutral, and that therefore its availability affords experimenters the 
option to not make any assumptions about the mathematical form of the discounting 
function with hyperbolas, hyperboloids, and exponentials. The widespread use of AUC is 
a testament to its convenience and utility as a point-estimate of individual discounting 
rates (Madden & Johnson, 2010), but it is not without its drawbacks. 
Area-under-the-curve measures of discounting are disproportionally influenced by 
long delays relative to short delays (Borges, Kuang, Milhorn, & Yi, 2016). In most 
preference assessments the delayed alternative is held constant and the immediate amount 
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Figure 2. Area-under-the-curve. Vertical dashed lines separate 6 trapezoids whose areas are summed 
to compute AUC. Left: IPs plotted as a function of standardized delay (standard method of calculating 
AUC; see Green et al., 2001); by this formulation, the trapezoid formed by the final two IPs 
constitutes approximately 80% of the final AUC estimate. Center: IPs plotted as a function of log-
transformed delay. Right: IPs plotted as a function of ordinal delays. Log and ordinal transformations 
of delays more evenly distribute the contribution of each trapezoid to AUC. 
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is adjusted until one IP is determined for each delay in a set of pseudo-exponentially 
scaled delays (e.g., in days: 1, 7, 30, 180, 365, 1825, 9125). Borges and colleagues (2016) 
show that when delays such as these are used to calculate AUC, the trapezoid comprised 
of the longest two delays (in our example, 1825 and 9125 days) constitutes approximately 
80% of the total AUC. In contrast, the four shortest delays constitute less than 5% of the 
total AUC. Given that nonlinear regression techniques used to estimate k values equally 
weight each indifference point, it seems inconsistent to use AUC if it is so 
disproportionally influenced by the final two IPs. Thus, Borges et al. suggest log-
transforming the delay to condense the delay scale and more closely equate the delay 
pairs in their contribution to the final measure of AUClogD. Alternatively, one might 
instead transform the delays from a ratio scale to an ordinal scale, making the difference 
between each delay one, and forcing each trapezoid to have the same width. See Figure 2 
(center) for an illustration of AUClogD and Figure 2 (right) for an illustration of AUCordD.  
Area-under-the-curve and k values estimated from Eq. 2 and 3 are regarded as 
valid estimates of the degree to which individuals discount the value of an outcome as a 
function of the delay to its availability. Indeed, all have seen use by experimenters 
investigating sensitivity to delay between groups or within individuals (Berry et al., 2017; 
Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; McKerchar et al., 2013; Odum, 2011). However, the new 
formulations of AUC proposed by Borges et al. (2016) have seen comparably less use 
due to them being proposed only recently. Therefore, further empirical exploration is 
necessary to determine the extent to which AUClogD and AUCordD capture the same 
information as AUC. 
Methodological effects in delay discounting paradigms 
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The degree to which people discount outcomes is moderated by a variety of task-
specific factors (Berry et al., 2017; Dehart & Odum, 2015; Read, Frederick, Orsel, & 
Rahman, 2005). For example, one well-studied phenomenon in delay discounting 
research is the magnitude effect, where it is observed that hypothetical small delayed 
rewards are discounted more steeply than larger ones. McKerchar and colleagues (2013) 
found that group median k values from Eqs. 2 and 3 were smaller for participants who 
discounted $25,000 compared to those who discounted $1,000. Comparable results have 
been reported by other authors comparing a range of reward magnitudes (Estle, Green, 
Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Green, Myerson, & Mcfadden, 1997; Vanderveldt, Oliveira, & 
Green, 2016). 
However, this magnitude effect is not reliably observed in experiments with 
animals (Green, Myerson, Holt, Slevin, & Estle, 2004, but c.f. Grace, Sargisson, & 
White, 2012), and a recent study showed that humans do not exhibit the magnitude effect 
when amounts are expressed as dots on a screen instead of numerically (Reyes-Huerta & 
dos Santos, 2016). Reyes-Huerta and dos Santos (2016) suggest that discounting rates do 
not vary as a function of magnitude when numerals are removed from the experimental 
context because participants must estimate the value of each alternative, rather than 
integrate a numerical value in the discounting process. Indeed, when amounts were 
presented as a collection of dots, participants underestimated the value of the immediate 
alternative in an AIA task when the value of the delayed reward was 16,000 Mexican 
pesos, but not when it was 2,000, suggesting non-linear scaling of amount estimation as a 
function of the magnitude of the delayed reward. Another noteworthy finding from their 
study is that effects of type of value representation (numeric vs. non-numeric) on 
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discounting rate were moderated by the starting point and direction of change of the 
immediate alternative, which is consistent with previous research demonstrating 
sequencing effects in delay discounting paradigms.  
Sequencing effects are observed when IPs are systematically biased as a function 
of the direction in which the immediate alternative is adjusted after each choice in a 
series of decision problems. Results from Robles, Vargas, and Bejarano (2009) and 
Robles and Vargas (2008) demonstrate the sequencing effect; see Figure 3 for an 
illustration. Participants in Robles et al.’s studies made a series of choices between an 
SSR and an LLR, where the former ranged from $1 to $1,000 and the latter was held 
constant at $1,000. Indifference points were estimated in both an ascending and 
descending sequence. Estimates of participants’ discounting rates—AUC and k values 
from a simple hyperbola (Eq. 2)—were higher in the ascending sequence, in which the 
SSR began at $1 and increased following each choice than in the descending sequence, in 
0
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Figure 3. The sequencing effect. Hypothetical indifference curves illustrate steeper discounting as a 
function of delay when immediate values begin at the minimum $1 and are increased between each 
choice (solid line) compared to when they begin at the maximum $1,000 and are decreased (dashed 
line). Curves are hyperbolic (Eq. 2), where k for each curve is the median k in Robles et al., 2009 
(kAscending = .002; kDescending = .0004). 
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which the SSR began at $1,000 and decreased after each choice. At present, the 
mechanism underlying such sequencing effects is unclear. 
A reference-dependent account of sequencing effects 
A possible explanation for sequencing effects, suggested by Robles and his 
colleagues (2008; 2009), instantiates a reference-dependent model of choice (Levin & 
Gaeth, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). This model proposes that people evaluate 
their options partly as a function of the way in which the decision problem is framed. 
Evidence for the effects of decision frame on human choice comes from both behavioral 
economics and experimental psychology (e.g. Dehart & Odum, 2015; Dshemuchadse et 
al., 2013; Tereyağoğlu, Fader, & Veeraraghavan, 2017; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). A 
quintessential example of framing effects can be seen in Table 1, and is taken from 
Tversky and Kahneman’s “Asian Disease Problem” (1981). Respondents (N = 152) were 
asked to imagine a scenario where the U.S. is preparing for an outbreak of a new Asian 
disease that is expected to kill 600 people. Half of the participants were assigned to the 
Gain frame condition, and the other half to the Loss frame condition; in each condition, 
Table 1
Choice varies as a function of decision frame
Frame Response options Choice %
Gain a. If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. a. 72%
b. If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability b. 28%
    that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability
    that no people will be saved.
Loss c. If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. c. 22%
d. If Program D is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability d. 78%
    that nobody will die, and a 2/3 probability that
    600 people will die.
Note. Response frequency values were taken from Tversky & Kahneman, 1981. N = 152
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the respondent was presented two alternatives to combat the disease and asked to indicate 
which they preferred. These alternatives were mathematically equivalent across 
conditions (all outcomes had an expected value of 200 lives saved), and differed only in 
the language used to describe them. In the Gain frame condition choices were framed in 
terms of people being saved, whereas in the Loss frame condition choices were framed in 
terms of people dying. Participants’ choice percentages are shown in Table 1, and the 
results are clear: the framing of the alternatives as either losses or gains had a systematic 
effect on participants’ responses. Specifically, the loss frame elicited risk-seeking choice, 
and the gain frame elicited risk-averse choice. 
This observed gain-loss framing effect in human decision making is a central 
tenet of Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Indeed, effects such as these are often 
attributed to loss aversion as it is described within this theoretical framework. Loss 
aversion is commonly conceptualized as the finding that, when it comes to humans 
making choices, “losses loom larger than gains” (Levin & Gaeth, 1998). Empirical 
evidence demonstrates that prospective losses often do carry greater weight than 
equivalent gains in human decision-making processes, especially in paradigms similar to 
the original Asian Disease Problem described above and others that establish a strong 
reference point (Kühberger, 1998). In his meta-analysis, Kühberger compiled 230 effect 
sizes from a diverse sample of paradigms and estimated that the average magnitude of 
framing effects was approximately Cohen’s d = 0.31 (weighted by sample size), and that 
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this effect was notably greater for paradigms that established a strong reference point 
(mean weighted d = 0.50). 
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of reference points and the gain-loss asymmetry in 
outcome evaluation processes. At the origin is a decision-maker’s reference point, which 
describes one’s current holdings—the status quo. Reference-dependent models of choice 
posit that all prospective gains and losses are evaluated in terms of deviations from this 
reference point. To the right and left of the origin along the x-axis is the nominal value of 
prospective gains and losses, respectively. The y-axis indicates the subjective value of 
gains and losses. The curves in the upper-right and lower-left quadrants represent the 
value functions for gains and losses, respectively. Imagine a decision-maker choosing to 
accept or reject an equivalent mixed gamble, where there is a 50% chance of winning 
some amount of money (+x) and a 50% chance of losing the same amount of money (–x). 
The value functions for gains and losses in Figure 4 predict that the pleasantness of the 
Subjective value 
Gains Losses 
+ x 
– x 
+ y 
– y ∙ λ 
Figure 4. Hypothetical value functions as posited by a reference-dependent model of choice. Curves in 
the lower-left and upper-right quadrants represent the subjective value assigned to prospective losses 
and gains, respectively. Details in text. 
 
  14 
prospective gain (+y) of the gamble is outweighed by the unpleasantness of the 
prospective loss (–y ∙ λ), where λ is a scaling factor characterizing the degree to which the 
decision-maker is loss averse. Thus, in contrast to classic “rational” economic theories of 
choice (e.g. expected value theory, see Edwards, 1954; Fishburn, 1970; Samuelson, 
1937) reference-dependent models of choice predict that decision-makers will tend to 
reject equivalent mixed gambles due to the fact that |(–y ∙ λ)| > (+y) when λ > 1; indeed, 
evidence shows that this is often the case (De Martino, Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010; 
Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; but c.f. Walasek & 
Stewart, 2015). 
Sequencing effects in the AIA discounting task may be the product of 
disproportionate weighting of losses relative to gains. In the descending sequence, 
immediate values are decreased between each choice trial. If a decision-maker were 
attentive to the direction in which value is changing—which reason predicts they would 
be, as it is the only changing parameter in the decision problem—then sequential changes 
in the negative direction may place them in a loss frame. The reference-dependent model 
of choice predicts that, because of framing effects, amount decrements (i.e. losses) 
experienced in the descending sequence should carry more subjective value relative to 
amount increments (i.e. gains) experienced in the ascending sequence. This gain-loss 
asymmetry could account for the systematic bias in discounting rates, as the subjective 
value of the SSR may not equal its nominal value (refer to Figure 4). Thus, the primary 
hypothesis of the present research is that differential sensitivity to gains and losses 
covaries with observed differences in estimated delay discounting rates between 
ascending and descending SSR sequences. 
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Estimating sensitivity to gain and loss frames with a mixed-gamble task 
Authors have employed myriad strategies to estimate the degree to which 
individuals are loss averse (Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, & L’Haridon, 2008; Abdellaoui, 
Bleichrodt, & Paraschiv, 2007; De Martino et al., 2010; Mukherjee, Sahay, 
Chandrasekhar, & Srinivasan, 2017; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009; Tom et al., 2007). While 
methods differ, the result of these assays are all point estimates of loss aversion: a single 
value which characterizes the extent to which prospective losses outweigh gains in 
participants’ decisions. For example, Tom et al. (2007), De Martino et al. (2010), and 
Walasek and Stewart (2015) asked participants to indicate whether they would accept or 
reject mixed gambles. Each participant’s responses were submitted to a logistic 
regression that predicted the odds of accepting a gamble from the specified gain and loss 
amounts. The ratio of the estimated loss and gain model coefficients were used to 
compute a loss aversion coefficient λ, which served as a point-estimate of a participant’s 
sensitivity to gain-loss framing effects. 
In summary, a reference-dependent model of choice predicts that the magnitude 
of sequencing effects in an AIA delay discounting tasks should covary with decision-
makers’ differential sensitivity to gains and losses. The experiment presented herein tests 
this hypothesis with a within-subjects correlational design: participants provided 
indifference data from ascending and descending sequences that informed estimates of 
their delay discounting rates and the magnitude of the sequencing effect. The correlation 
between this effect and point-estimates of loss aversion was tested. A positive correlation 
between loss aversion and the magnitude of the sequencing effect would support the 
notion that discounting rates as estimated by AIA choice procedures are partly 
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confounded by an alternative, distinct process responsible for framing effects. Analyses 
also explored various quantitative models of delay discounting to assess the degree to 
which they captured the same information. 
  
  17 
CHAPTER 2 
METHODS 
Participants 
Participants were current undergraduate students recruited from Arizona State 
University’s West Campus volunteer pool, and were compensated with course credit. An 
a priori power analysis conducted with the software G*Power suggested a sample size of 
N = 43 to detect a sequencing effect of size d = 0.57 with a Type I Error probability α = 
.05 and power (1 – β) = .95 (Erdfelder, Faul, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). This effect size 
was estimated from descriptive statistics on AUC values given in Robles et al. (2009). 
Eighty-one (81) volunteers completed all experimental protocol by the end of the Fall 
2017 semester. Data collection was continued beyond N = 43 to buffer against exclusion 
of participants based on a priori criteria described later in this section. 
Procedure 
All participants completed two computer assessments presented in 
counterbalanced order. One estimated delay discounting rates in ascending and 
descending SSR conditions, and the other estimated loss aversion. All experimental 
programs were written in Python 3.0. Computers were standard Dell desktop PCs, and all 
responses were recorded with the left button on a standard two-button mouse. The 
experiment took approximately 25 minutes to complete. 
Abbreviated delay discounting task 
Figure 5 (left) depicts the choice interface used in the Abbreviated delay discounting 
task (ADT). This task was identical to that used by Robles et al. (2009), which is an 
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abbreviated version of the original procedure used by Rachlin et al. (1991). After the 
experimenter started the program, the participant read the following instructions: 
“This program will show you a series of screens where you will be asked to choose 
between an amount of money available now and $1,000 available after some 
delay. The money in this program is hypothetical, “pretend money,” but please 
make your selections as if you were really going to get the amounts you choose. 
We don’t expect you to choose one in particular, so please don’t select what you 
think we might want you to choose, but click on the alternative you really would 
prefer. After each choice, the program will go on to the next screen, and it will 
tell you when you are done. Now click on the START button when you are ready 
to begin.” 
In each trial, participants chose between two alternatives by clicking the left mouse 
button over a command button associated with their preferred outcome. After making 
their selection, a separate screen presented a new button labeled “CONTINUE” that, 
when pressed, began a new trial with the next pair of choices. One choice was always an 
amount of money available immediately (SSR), and the other always $1,000 available 
after a delay (LLR). Whether the SSR was presented on the left- or right-hand side of the 
screen was determined randomly for each trial. The 30 possible values of the SSR are the 
same as those used in previous studies (US $1000, $999, $995, $990, $960, $940, $920, 
$850, $800, $750, $700, $650, $600, $550, $500, $450, $400, $350, $300, $250, $200, 
$150, $100, $80, $60, $40, $20, $10, $5, $1), and IPs for the LLR were estimated in 8 
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different delay blocks (6 hours, 1 day, 1 week, 2 months, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years, and 
25 years). Participants completed the ascending and descending SSR conditions in a 
random order. 
Conditions differed in the starting value and direction of change of the SSR. In the 
ascending condition, the value of the SSR began at $1 for each delay block and increased 
with each choice of the LLR. Once a participant chose the SSR, the value of the SSR in 
that trial was recorded as the IP and the next delay block began. In the descending 
condition, the SSR began at $1,000 and decreased with each choice of the SSR. Once a 
participant chose the LLR, the value of the SSR in that trial was recorded as the IP and 
the next delay block began. Delay blocks within each condition were presented in 
ascending order. Omitting choices beyond the IP reduces the amount of time the 
assessment takes, and has not been shown to systematically bias IPs (Robles & Vargas, 
2008; Robles, Vargas, & Bejarano, 2009). 
Mixed-gamble loss aversion task 
Figure 5 (right) depicts the choice interface used in the mixed-gamble loss aversion 
task (MGT), which is similar to that used by other authors (De Martino et al., 2010; Tom 
et al., 2007; Walasek & Stewart, 2015). In the MGT, participants indicate whether they 
Figure 5. Choice screens used in the ADT and MGT. Left. The choice screen presented in the 
ADT. Whether the SSR was presented on the left or right was randomly determined for each new 
trial. Right. The choice screen presented in the MGT. Whether the “accept” button was presented 
on the left or right was randomly determined for each new trial. 
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would accept or reject each of 225 unique hypothetical mixed gambles, each of which 
features a 50% chance of gaining some amount of money and a 50% chance of losing 
some amount of money. The prospective gains and losses both ranged from $80 to $332 
with increments of $18 between each value; participants responded to each possible 
combination of gain and loss amounts, which were presented in a pseudo-random order. 
Prior to the presentation of any gambles, participants read the following instructions: 
“This program will show you a series of screens where you will be asked to choose 
whether or not you would accept a hypothetical gamble. Please answer by 
pressing the 'accept' button if you would take the gamble, and the 'reject' button if 
you would not. All gambles are 50/50 shots; that is, there is a 50% chance of 
winning the green money and a 50% chance of losing the red money. We don't 
expect you to choose in any particular way, so please don't choose what you think 
we might want you to choose, but click on the choice you really would prefer 
given the option in real life. After each choice, the program will go on to the next 
screen, and it will tell you when you are done. Please click on the START button 
when you are ready to begin.” 
Participants were shown one gamble at a time and made their selection by clicking 
the left mouse button over a command button labeled either “accept gamble” or “reject 
gamble.” After making their selection, a separate screen presented a new button labeled 
“CONTINUE” that, when pressed, began a new trial with the next gamble. 
Data exclusion 
Delay discounting exclusion criteria were chosen to maximize sample variability 
and minimize that contributed by non-monotonic discounters. Thus, participants were 
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excluded from all analyses if either of their sets of IPs had two or more instances where 
any single IP was greater than the preceding IP by more than $200. Four participants 
were excluded on the basis of this criterion (Johnson & Bickel, 2008). Johnson and 
Bickel (2008) also argued that participants may be excluded if the last IP (at 25 years) in 
a set of IPs was not less than the first (at 6 hours) by at least $100; this criterion was 
unused here to include those who are relatively insensitive to delay. 
Data were also excluded from all analyses if the statistical software was unable to 
fit a logistic regression model to participants’ MGT data. Thirteen participants responded 
so uniformly (i.e., rejected all gambles) that the software was unable to estimate model 
parameters. In other words, the logistic regression resulted in perfect predictions for these 
participants’ responses to the hypothetical gambles, making parameter estimation 
mathematically impossible. Three more participants were excluded as their models were 
unable to converge after 25 iterations. In sum, 20 participants were excluded from all 
analyses, reducing the total sample size from N = 81 to N = 61 (75%). 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Data analysis 
Except for hyperboloid (Eq. 3) model fits, all computations and statistical 
analyses were conducted in R, an open-source statistical computing software. 
Hyperboloid models were fit to indifference point data with the Microsoft Excel 2016 
Solver add-in. Where appropriate, effect sizes are reported as Cohen’s d. 
Is there a sequencing effect in the ADT? 
Hyperbolic (Eq. 2) and hyperboloid models (Eq. 3) were fit to each participant’s 
set of indifference points from the ascending and descending conditions with nonlinear 
least-squares regression. AUC, AUClogD, and AUCordD (Eq. 4) were computed for each 
participant in each condition. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for ln(k)hyperbola, 
ln(k)hyperboloid, ln(s), AUC, AUClogD, and AUCordD, and Table 3 shows bivariate 
correlations between measures. Note that AUClogD values can exceed one because the log 
of the shortest delay (0.25 days) is a negative number.  
Included in Table 2 is the Standard Error of the Regression (SER) for the 
hyperbola and hyperboloid models: 
 Residual
SS
SER
n p


  (5) 
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where SSResidual is the sum of squared residuals between the observed and predicted IPs, n 
is the number of IPs, and p is the number of free parameters in the model. The SER 
provides an index of goodness-of-fit that is better suited for non-linear models than the 
coefficient of determination R2, because the former does not assume a linear relationship. 
Furthermore, the SER is exactly the size of the average residual, and thus features an 
intuitive interpretation: the mean number of dollars by which the predicted IP differs 
from the observed IP. Interestingly, mean SERs were significantly smaller in the 
descending condition for both hyperbolic fits, t(120) = 3.40, p < .001, and hyperboloid 
fits, t(120) = 3.70, p < .001.This finding suggests that these models of discounting were 
more predictive of IPs when SSRs decreased compared to when they increased. 
Figure 6 (left) illustrates the sequencing effect at the participant-level across 
various measures of delay discounting rate in participant-pair plots. Ln(k)hyperboloid and 
ln(s) values are not shown because hyperboloid model parameters cannot independently 
indicate a sequencing effect and are addressed later. Participants’ ln(k)hyperbola, AUC, 
AUClogD, and AUCordD are plotted as colored circles and are separated by condition. Gray 
lines connect each participant’s estimated delay discounting rate between ascending and 
descending conditions, and black targets are condition means. Note that larger ln(k) 
values indicate greater discounting, whereas larger AUC values indicate less discounting. 
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for the abbreviated delay discounting task
Sequence condition ln (k ) ln (s ) SER AUC AUClogD AUCordD
Ascending Hyperbola mean (SD) -6.39(4.55) -- 181.95(143.19) .446(.305) 0.785(0.300) .589(.232)
median -7.11 -- 150.28 .458 0.864 .659
Hyperboloid mean (SD) -6.15(6.03) -0.49(1.29) 180.41(155.02) -- -- --
median -5.32 -0.39 159.28 -- -- --
Descending Hyperbola mean (SD) -8.89(2.61) -- 109.46(84.71) .626(.280) 0.958(.0157) .721(.126)
median -9.48 -- 91.09 .705 0.999 .756
Hyperboloid mean (SD) -5.54(3.97) -1.01(1.38) 79.08(73.37) -- -- --
median -4.41 -0.71 57.45 -- -- --
Note. SER = standard error of the regression; AUC = area under the curve; SD = standard deviation
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These plots demonstrate that—despite substantial variation between participants—an 
ascending sequence of immediate values usually engenders more impulsive choice. 
This conclusion was corroborated by significance tests. As khyperbola values were 
positively skewed, condition differences in discounting rate were assessed with a paired-
sample Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. AUC values were more normally distributed, and 
thus simple linear regressions were used to compare delay discounting rates by sequence 
condition on these measures. Partial regression coefficients bs are reported. Each 
comparison indicated a statistically significant sequencing effect, with steeper observed 
discounting in the ascending condition: khyperbola, W = 1552, p < .001, median difference = 
0.0004; AUC, t(60) = 4.37, p < .001, b = 0.18, d = 0.62; AUClogD, t(60) = 4.59, p < .001, 
b = 0.17, d = 0.72; and AUCordD, t(60) = 4.54, p < .001, b = 0.13, d = 0.70. To examine 
potential methodological and demographical confounds, multiple linear regression 
analyses were conducted predicting discounting rate from sequence condition, task order 
(MGT or ADT first), condition order (ascending or descending sequence first), and 
participants’ age and sex. All multiple regression models retained unique statistical  
Figure 6 (Reverse). Sequence effects. Left. Participant-pair plots of estimated delay discounting rates 
across conditions as measured by khyperbola, AUC, AUClogD, and AUCordD. Black arrows indicate the 
direction of a statistically significant difference. Right. Probability density functions of estimated delay 
discounting rates across conditions. *p < .001 
 
Table 3
Bivariate correlation matrix of delay discounting measures
Measure ln (k ) AUC AUC logD AUC ordD
ln (k ) -- -.78* -.93* -.93*
AUC -- -- .79* .80*
AUC logD -- -- -- .99*
AUC ordD -- -- -- --
Note . AUC = Area under the discounting curve. *p  < .001
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Min Max 
Range 
Ascending Descending 
Sequence 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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significance of the sequence condition parameter (all coefficient ps < .05) and 
suggested no unique influence of sex, task order, or ADT condition order on discounting 
rate (all ps > .05). In addition, all multiple regression models identified age as a unique 
predictor of discounting rate (all ps < .05), with older participants making more self-
controlled choices than younger participants. Such a relationship is consistent with 
previous research (Green et al., 1994).   
Figure 6 (right) shows probability density functions (pdfs) of the same measures 
of delay discounting rate. These pdfs afford additional confidence in the robustness of the 
sequencing effect to outliers. For example, six outliers in the ascending condition can be 
seen in the ln(k)hyperbola participant-pair plot (Fig. 6, top-left); those with a critical eye may 
wonder if these outliers are the driving force behind the difference between the means of 
the ascending and descending conditions. However, the pdfs of ln(k)s (Fig. 6, top-right) 
mitigate these concerns: the pdf of the ascending sequence is near-uniformly shifted to 
the right, indicating steeper discounting in this condition relative to the descending 
sequence, and features only a slight increase in density in its right tail. Clearly, the 
observed difference between these two distributions is not wholly due to outliers. Taken 
together, these data suggest that the ascending presentation of immediate values in the 
ADT engenders more impulsive choice than the descending presentation of the same 
amounts. 
Does the hyperboloid model demonstrate a sequencing effect? 
Figure 7 shows four condition median indifference curves: one curve is drawn for 
each condition per the hyperbola (solid lines) and hyperboloid (dashed lines). Visual 
inspection of the IPs, the simple hyperbola, and the hyperbola with the delay raised to a 
  27 
power s indicates that participants discounted the value of the delayed alternative more in 
the ascending sequence than in the descending sequence (note the steepness of the orange 
[ascending] lines relative to the blue [descending] lines). The hyperboloid rate parameter 
khyperboloid and scaling parameter s were both positively skewed and were thus natural-log 
transformed for statistical analyses. However, a statistical comparison of distributions of 
ln(k)hyperboloid between the ascending and descending conditions would not be analogous 
to between-condition comparisons of ln(k)hyperbola if the power s in the hyperboloid model 
differed from one. Note that ln(1) = 0. Thus, a one-sample t-test was conducted to 
compare the distribution of ln(s) against the null hypothesis of ln(s) = 0, which revealed 
that the mean ln(s) was significantly less than zero, t(121) = -6.11, p < .001, d = -0.55.  
Different parameters within mathematical models of behavior are meant to model 
independent processes; thus, there should be no or minimal correlation between estimates 
of ln(k)hyperboloid and ln(s). A significant correlation would imply that these parameters 
model the same or similar processes, and should not be interpreted independently. A test 
Figure 7. Best-fitting group-level discounting curves per hyperbolic (solid lines) and hyperboloid 
(dashed lines) models for the ascending (orange) and descending (blue) sequence conditions. 
Indifference points (diamonds) were condition median IPs for each delay. 
 
  28 
of the Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient r suggested that these parameters 
were inversely related, r(120) = -0.62, p < .001. A correlation coefficient of r = -0.62 
indicates a strong relationship by conventional standards (Cohen, 1992), and such 
collinearity discourages the independent interpretation of estimates of k and s as “rate” 
and “scaling” parameters, respectively. Therefore, no attempt to do so will be made here, 
and the reader is directed to Figure 7 to conclude that the fit of Eq. 3 does not provide 
evidence against the presence of a sequencing effect. 
Were participants loss averse? 
Following Walasek & Stewart (2015) and Tom et al. (2007), MGT responses 
were analyzed by fitting a logistic regression to each participant’s responses, which were 
dummy-coded as accept gamble = 1, reject gamble = 0: 
 
( )
1 ( )
bias gains losses
P accept
Log gain loss
P accept
  
 
     
 
  (6) 
The estimated partial regression weights βlosses and βgains characterize a participant’s 
sensitivity to prospective loss and gain, respectively. The absolute value of the ratio of 
each participant’s estimated βlosses to βgains were used to calculate loss aversion coefficients 
λ: 
 losses
gains



   (7) 
The intercept parameter βbias is included to account for any tendency to respond “accept” 
holding constant the influence of the prospective gains and losses. Thus, the resulting λs 
are a more precise function of participants’ differential sensitivities to losses and gains. 
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Note that loss aversion is observed when λ > 1; λ = 1 and λ < 1 suggest that participants 
are loss-neutral and loss-seeking, respectively. 
Figure 8 (top) shows that the empirical cumulative distribution function (ecdf) for 
|βlosses| is shifted to the right of the ecdf for βgains; a nonparametric two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test suggested that these parameters were likely not sampled from 
the same underlying population distribution, D = 0.98, p < .001. Figure 8 (middle) pairs 
each participant’s estimated βgains and |βlosses|; a simple linear regression showed that, on 
average, participants’ |βlosses| were greater than their βgains, t(60) = 3.91, p < .001, b = 0.03, 
d = 0.25.   
Figure 8 (bottom) transposes the pdf of observed loss aversion coefficients λ 
(purple) and the pdf of a hypothetical “null” distribution where the mean λ = 1 (gray). 
The dashed vertical line intersects with λ = 1. Coefficients are bounded within the range 
of [0, +∞] and more closely resemble a log-normal distribution than a gamma 
distribution; Akaike information criterions for these distributions were 176 and 189, 
respectively. Therefore, the hypothetical null distribution is comprised of 1,000 values 
randomly sampled from a hypothetical log-normal distribution with a mean of 1 and 
standard deviation of 1.57—the sample λ standard deviation. The distribution of observed 
λs is shifted slightly to the right and exhibits greater density in its right tail than the null; a 
one-sample t-test conducted on natural-log transformed λ values supported the conclusion 
that the mean λ (λmean = 1.96; λmedian = 1.19) was greater than 1, t(60) = 5.28, p < .001, d = 
0.68. These data from the MGT task collectively show that loss aversion was observed: 
the decisions made by most participants to accept or reject the hypothetical gambles were 
driven more strongly by prospective losses than prospective gains. 
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Figure 8. Top. Empirical cumulative distribution functions of |βlosses| (red) and βgains (green). The arrow 
illustrates the difference between the two functions. Middle. Participant-pair plot of βgains and |βlosses|. 
Gray lines connect each participant’s estimated coefficients, and the black line connects coefficient 
means (targets). Bottom. Probability density functions for observed λs (purple) and a hypothetical null 
distribution (gray) where the mean λ = 1. The hypothetical distribution is comprised of 1,000 random 
samples from a lognormal distribution with a mean of 1 and observed sample λ standard deviation of 
1.57. The vertical dashed line is at λ = 1. *p < .001.  
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Can a reference-dependent model account for sequencing effects? 
The magnitude of the sequencing effect for each measure of delay discounting 
rate was computed as the difference between the ascending and descending rates. Simple 
linear regressions were used to model the relationship between the magnitude of the 
sequencing effect and natural-log transformed λ values; standardized coefficients (β) are 
reported. For each delay discounting measure, significance tests failed to reject the null 
hypothesis that the sequencing effect and loss aversion coefficients were unrelated: 
khyperbola, t(59) = -1.35, p = .18, β = -0.17; AUC, t(59) = 0.54, p = .59, β = 0.07; AUClogD, 
t(59) = 0.53, p = .60, β = 0.07; AUCordD, t(59) = 0.41, p = .69, β = 0.05. Figure 9 shows a 
scatterplot of magnitude of sequencing effect scores as measured by AUC and loss 
aversion coefficients along with the best-fitting linear model. It is important to note, 
however, that failure to reject the null hypothesis is not the same as evidence in its favor. 
Figure 9. Predicting sequencing effect magnitudes (in terms of AUC) by loss aversion 
coefficients. The blue dashed line represents the best-fitting unstandardized linear relationship 
(equation inset) between these two variables. 
 
Model: Y = 0.037X – 0.196, 
r2 = .005 
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Therefore, Bayesian estimation procedures were employed to examine the strength of 
evidence in favor of the null. 
Bayesian methods can provide evidence in support of the null hypothesis, and 
they allow the analyst to incorporate information regarding the distribution of parameter 
estimates in the form of a prior distribution (Kruschke, 2014). The priors used to estimate 
correlations between the sequencing effect and loss aversion were normally distributed 
and weakly informative: they predicted effect sizes centered around a mean of zero—
biasing parameter estimates towards a null effect—with a standard deviation of 0.5. This 
dispersion parameter is wide, and was chosen because there is no previous research on 
the correlation between these two variables. Thus, this prior reflects two reasonable 
assumptions: a relatively small correlation is more likely than a large one, but all are 
theoretically plausible. Bayesian estimation also allows the analyst to specify a non-
normal population distribution for the predicted variable. Therefore, no variables were 
transformed to conform to a normal distribution. The prior distribution and data (also 
called a likelihood distribution) combine to estimate a posterior distribution of parameter 
estimates, which is used to make inferences about likely parameter values. 
There is no threshold used to determine “statistical significance” in Bayesian 
estimation as in null hypothesis significance testing. However, multiple statistics can be 
used to drive inferences and are reported. Bayes Factors (BF01) represent the ratio of the 
marginal likelihoods for the null hypothesis (H0) relative to an alternative hypothesis (H1) 
given the data: 
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where D is the data. As Eq. 8 implies, marginal likelihoods may be interpreted as the 
probability of observing the data if the model in question is true. Thus, evidence mounts 
for H0 as BF01 increases from 1, and mounts for H1 as BF01 reduces from 1. Other 
statistics are the mean parameter estimate (bB)—the mean of the posterior distribution—
and 95% credibility intervals (CI 95: [min, max]), where min and max bound the central 
95% of the posterior distribution. Note that credibility intervals differ from confidence 
intervals in that the former represent a characteristic of the posterior distribution, whereas 
the latter predict the range within which 95% of parameter estimates will fall after 
repeated samples. 
A skewed normal distribution was specified as the population distribution from 
which sequencing effect magnitudes were drawn for khyperbola, as a D’Agostino test 
suggested that the sample distribution was positively skewed (skewness = 5.89), D(61) = 
8.47, p < .001. A normal distribution was specfied for all AUC measures. For each 
measure, a Bayesian simple linear regression estimated a posterior distribution strongly in 
favor of the null hypothesis that loss aversion coefficients and the magnitude of the 
sequencing effect were unrelated: khyperbola, bB = -.01, CI 95: [-.01, .01], BF01 = 14979.87; 
AUC, bB = .02, CI 95: [-.04, .08], BF01 = 352.92; AUClogD, bB = .02, CI 95: [-.04, .07], 
BF01 = 12107.36; AUCordD, bB = .01, CI 95: [-.03, .05], BF01 = 576.92. To interpret these 
results, consider statistics reported for AUC: the BF01 = 352.92 suggests that if one 
entered the hypothesis testing process with minimal information regarding the 
distribution of correlation coefficients, they should now be approximately 353 times more 
confident in H0 than H1. Said another way, the likelihood of observing these data under a 
null model is 353 times greater than the likelihood of observing them under an alternative 
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model. The CI 95: [-.04, .08] specifies that there is a .95 probability that the correlation 
between the magnitude of the sequencing effect and loss aversion lies between r = -.04 
and r = .08. 
Figure 10 superimposes the estimated posterior distribution of correlation 
coefficients between λ and the magnitude of the sequencing effect with the specified prior 
for AUC; plots of khyperbola, AUClogD, and AUCordD effects are qualitatively similar. 
Vertical dashed lines bound the 95% credibility interval for the posterior distribution. 
Two important features of Figure 10 assist with inferences made on the basis of this 
analysis. First, the posterior distribution is narrower than the prior, which reflects the fact 
that the data are informative and can be used to update one’s beliefs and exclude unlikely 
parameter estimates (e.g., those outside the CI). Second, the 95% credibility interval 
includes r = 0, which suggests that the null relationship is more probable than 
Figure 10. Superimposed prior (gray) and posterior (blue) distributions for the correlation coefficient 
between loss aversion and the magnitude of the sequencing effect as measured by AUC. The prior 
distribution is normal with mean = 0 and SD = 0.5, and the posterior is normal with mean = .02 and 
SD = .03; 95% of its density is within the range -.04 > r > .08, as shown by vertical dashed lines. 
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relationships of a magnitude outside the interval. Thus, the inference drawn from this 
analysis is clear: given the large BF01, minute effect size (r
2 = bB
2 = .0004), and 95% 
credibility interval that includes r = 0, loss aversion likely accounts for an 
inconsequential amount of the variance produced by sequence condition. Furthermore, 
this result generalizes to all measures of delay discounting rate given the high 
convergence between estimated posterior distributions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The present research predicted a positive correlation between the sequencing 
effect in the ADT with individual differences in loss aversion as measured by the MGT. 
The sequencing effect and loss aversion were observed (Figs. 6, 7 and 8), but both 
frequentist and Bayesian analyses suggested that these variables are likely unrelated 
(Figs. 9 and 10). 
Researchers primarily use ln(k)hyperbola and/or AUC values to compare delay 
discounting rates between experimental groups or populations (Madden & Johnson, 
2010), with AUClogD and AUCordD seeing considerably less use. The present findings 
suggest that all of these measures are valid estimates of delay discounting rate, as 
evidenced by statistically significant correlation coefficients reported in Table 3. 
Moreover, pdfs of these variables (Fig. 6, right) suggest that log- and ordinally-
transformed delays produce a distribution of AUCs that may be closer to normal than 
conventional AUC values, albeit with slight negative skewness. Therefore, the data 
presented here suggest that it may be preferable to apply inferential statistical tests to 
these transformed measures in order to more closely adhere to assumptions of normality, 
and to not overweight long delays relative to short ones in the calculation of discounting 
rates. 
Hyperbola and hyperboloid goodness-of-fit were not assessed with measures of 
R2 despite its conventional use in the delay discounting literature. In a simulation study, 
Spiess and Neumeyer (2010) demonstrated the inadequacy of R2 as a descriptor of model 
fit in non-linear models. They instead advocate the use of Akaike and Bayesian 
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Information Criteria for researchers interested in model selection, as these measures had 
higher rates of correct rejections and acceptances compared to R2. Interestingly, these 
authors also assessed the quality of residual variance as a model selection tool and found 
that it performed no better than R2. Residual variance and SER are similar indices: SER is 
simply the square root of the residual variance. However, SERs were not used here for 
model selection, but rather for model description as they afford a highly intuitive 
interpretation in the context of indifference points. Researchers fitting equations to 
indifference points might consider replacing R2 as a goodness-of-fit index with a more 
appropriate, intuitive statistic—SER should be considered an attractive candidate due to 
its interpretability and simplicity. 
 Results from the MGT indicate that the majority of participants’ choices were 
consistent with the notion of loss aversion. A loss aversion coefficient λ > 1 suggests that 
a participant was more heavily influenced by prospective losses than prospective gains in 
the MGT, whereas a λ < 1 indicates the opposite. As can be seen in Figure 8 (bottom), 
participants generally exhibited at least mild loss aversion (λmean = 1.96; λmedian = 1.19); 
Equation 6 estimated 45 λs > 1, 15 λs < 1, and one λ = 1, and a test of ln(λ)s against the 
null hypothesis of ln(λ)mean = 0 estimated a Cohen’s d of 0.68—an effect size consistent 
with those reported by Kühberger (1998). Such convergence suggests that the MGT 
accurately captures sensitivty to framing effects, despite recent reports of potential 
methodological shortcomings relating to task stimuli (Walasek & Stewart, 2015). 
Nonetheless, numerous features of the MGT have yet to be fully explored. Task 
parameters such as the magnitude and ease of divisibility of dollar amounts in the MGT 
may have effects on estimates of loss aversion (Harinck, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & 
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Mersmann, 2007; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2009); thus, future research in this area is 
warranted. 
A perceptual account of sequencing effects in the ADT 
The primary hypothesis tested here was that sequencing effect magnitudes would 
be correlated with estimates of sensitivity to framing effects. Frequentist statistical tests 
failed to reject the null hypothesis, and Bayesian statistical procedures supported the null 
hypothesis that these variables are unrelated. These results call into question the influence 
of reference points on choice in tasks such as the ADT. Importantly, reference-dependent 
models include two decision-making stages: an initial framing stage followed by an 
evaluation stage (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The data shown here suggest that 
participants may not consciously frame changes in the SSR as losses or gains; rather, they 
might evaluate each decision without paying much attention to the direction of change in 
the SSR between trials. Thus, a perceptual account of the sequencing effect may be more 
tenable, as it does not rely on participants’ framing of improvements and decrements in 
SSRs as gains and losses from a reference point. 
Research in psychophysics has demonstrated that people’s estimates of stimulus 
magnitude are often biased towards the values assigned to previously-judged stimuli. As 
a result, people overestimate the magnitude of a stimulus when stimuli are presented in a 
Figure 11. A perceptual account of sequencing effects. 
 
Ascending 
sequence 
Descending 
sequence 
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descending sequence, and underestimate it when stimuli are presented in an ascending 
sequence (Cross, 1973; Jesteadt, Luce, & Green, 1977; Petzschner, Glasauer, & Stephan, 
2015). It may be the case that participants make choices in the ADT by evaluating the 
initially non-preferred option (i.e., the LLR in the descending condition and the SSR in 
the ascending condition); importantly, this perceptual model of choice rests on this 
assumption. Figure 11 illustrates the hypothesis in the context of the ADT in the 
ascending and descending sequences. The number line represents relative values of the 
non-preferred alternative, from $1 to $1,000, and the filled circles represent to-be judged 
values of the initially non-preferred alternative of magnitude Sj within ascending (A) and 
descending (D) conditions. Sj is preceded by n previously-evaluated options (open 
circles)  δj-n. The estimated value of Sj within a trial is δj, which is subject to bias (θ) 
introduced by all or some of these preceding judgments. When the previous judgments 
were larger than Sj (as in D), δj > Sj; when they were smaller (as in A), δj < Sj.  
The logic of this perceptual hypothesis draws on a Bayesian framework of 
magnitude estimation recently discussed in Petzchner et al. (2015). In Bayesian inference, 
wider likelihood distributions (i.e., more variable observations) exert a weaker effect on 
the posterior distribution than narrower, more precise observations. This perceptual 
account proposes that the width of the likelihood distribution is determined by the 
certainty of the value of the present non-preferred alternative Sj. The posterior 
distribution of estimates δj is a product of the likelihood and prior distributions—the 
latter of which is some function of δj-n. Thus, less certain estimates of Sj exhibit a weaker 
influence on δj, which is biased towards the prior. It is important to note that, although Sj 
is a given numerical stimulus (e.g., $1,000), participants must estimate how much Sj is 
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actually worth to them, a process that introduces error. The greater the error about Sj, the 
stronger the relative influence of the prior δj-n, and the larger the bias θ of δj towards it. 
Therefore, if the width of the distribution of estimates Sj is greater in the ascending 
sequence than the descending sequence, then θD > θA, and choice is more biased towards 
the LLR in the descending sequence than in the ascending sequence.  
The present data and this Bayesian framework allow for an initial exploration of 
this perceptual hypothesis, albeit only at the group level. Coefficients of variation (CV = 
SD/Mean) provide a measure of variability of Sj that is relative to the mean estimate. As 
such, CVs should index the uncertainty of estimates of Sj between participants and hence, 
the width of the likelihood distribution. Therefore, CVs of indifference points (the closest 
possible approximation of Sjs available here) were calculated for each delay within the 
ascending and descending conditions at the group level. 
Figure 12 shows CVs of Sjs across the range of delays for the two conditions. 
There is a clear effect of sequence condition on CVs: there was more within-condition 
variability in Sjs in the ascending sequence relative to the descending sequence. This 
finding is consistent with the proposed perceptual account of the sequencing effect, as the 
CV of the likelihood distribution for Sj is inversely related to its influence on the 
posterior. Indeed, assuming priors of equal width and relative location across conditions, 
θD > θA. However, inferences drawn from this analysis should be qualified because they 
are based on group-level data, and may be unrepresentative of single participants’ 
repeated judgments. Furthermore, this hypothesis assumes that participants specifically 
attend to and evaluate the non-preferred alternative in each trial. Thus, whether or not the 
sequencing effect is due to the perceptual bias proposed here is a question that may be 
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better answered by a within-subjects design wherein the width of the likelihood 
distribution Sj is estimated for each participant with repeated sequences of each delay. 
Additional insights may also be provided by eye-tracking data to determine which 
stimulus participants allocate more attention towards in each trial. 
Methodological considerations 
 Alternatively, the null relationship between people’s loss aversion coefficients 
and sequencing effect magnitudes may be attributable to modality-specific processes in 
the MGT and ADT. For instance, the loss averse behavior elicited in the MGT may be 
specific to probabilistic outcomes, and sequencing effects in the ADT specific to delayed 
outcomes. That said, there are some similarities between delay and probability 
discounting processes; for example, Lawyer and colleagues (2010) found that IPs for 
sexual and monetary rewards elicited in both types of discounting tasks were well-
described by a hyperbolic function. Such findings are consistent with a single-process 
Figure 12. Group-level coefficients of variation (CV) of indifference points as a function of delay 
for the ascending (orange) and descending (blue) sequence conditions. The CV of a likelihood 
distribution is inversely related to its influence on the posterior. 
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view in which a shared mechanism underlies both probability and delay discounting 
(Rachlin et al., 1991). However, to the author’s knowledge, sequencing effects have not 
been explored in the context of probability discounting. Thus, it is unclear whether 
differences in discounting rate between ascending or descending sequences are caused by 
a shared delay–probability mechanism or some third variable; this awaits experimental 
psychologists as a line of future research. 
The sample size used in the present experiment was determined to be sufficient to 
detect a sequencing effect of size d = 0.57, and the present data suggest a comparable 
effect size (range of ds: .62–.72). However, a substantially greater sample size may be 
necessary to detect a statistically significant correlation between loss aversion 
coefficients and sequencing effect magnitude. A power analysis in G*Power suggested 
that 779 participants would be necessary to detect a significant correlation of r = .1 with 
power (1 – β) = .80 and α = .05 (Erdfelder et al., 2009). This sample size is reduced to 82 
if r = .3; however, both of these estimates are likely too large given the posterior 
distribution of correlation coefficients (see Fig. 10). Nonetheless, replication of the null 
effect reported here with a larger sample size would increase the confidence that the 
present results are not a Type II error (i.e. a false negative). 
Thirteen of 81 participants responded so uniformly in the MGT that a logistic 
regression was unable to estimate model parameters—such response patterns may be due 
to two task-specific parameters: the attractiveness of the gambles and the number of 
response options. First, the most attractive gamble in the MGT featured a potential gain 
of $332 and loss of $80—a gain/loss ratio of 4.15. Participants who are particularly loss 
averse might reject even these gambles; to encourage them to accept at least some 
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gambles, it might be necessary to make an offer they cannot refuse. Thus, future 
instantiations of the MGT might consider extending the sampling origin of losses and 
gains to include more alluring gain/loss ratios, or even some gambles that include 
prospective losses of $0. Second, forcing participants to either “accept” or “reject” 
gambles reduces the fine-grainedness of the assessment (Krosnick & Presser, 2010; 
Preston & Colman, 2000). That is, participants may possess some degree of uncertainty 
regarding their choice, and may be biased towards rejecting a gamble when they are 
unsure of their preference. To avoid this issue, MGT responses could be instead 
expressed on an ordinal scale with options such as “definitely accept,” “maybe accept,” 
“maybe reject,” and “definitely reject.” Such response scales have been used before in 
MGTs (e.g., Tom et al., 2007), but their merits and limitations have not yet been 
compared to those of binary scales. 
Conclusion 
 In summary, the present experiment sought to relate sequencing effects in a delay 
discounting task to loss aversion via a reference-dependent model of choice, and the data 
did not support this relationship. In fact, Bayesian procedures provided very strong 
support for the null hypothesis for each quantitative measure of delay discounting rate. 
As such, an attentive, motivational account of sequencing effects in the ADT is 
unsatisfactory. A low-level, perceptual hypothesis built within a Bayesian framework was 
proposed and furnished with some preliminary supporting evidence. Future research 
should explore methodological parameters that influence choice in the ADT and MGT, 
the covariance and applicability of various quantitative models of delay discounting rate, 
and the application of Bayesian analytical procedures to test the perceptual account of 
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sequencing effects. Importantly, the proposed perceptual hypothesis does not explain why 
indifference points are more variable in the ascending sequence than in the descending 
sequence. Thus, this observation is worthy of further study per se. 
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